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The writer's apology for thus trespassing on this field is his desire to
promote a frank adoption of a dynamic method in psychology.
C. L. H E R R I C K .
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, September, 1898.
THE POSTULATES OF A STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY.1
This article is a manifesto of importance to all students of psy-
chology and philosophy. Its question has become one of general im-
portance,1 and Professor Titchener, by virtue of his recognized achieve-
ments in his chosen field of psychology, and by virtue of his general
official prominence, is more than entitled to deal authoritatively with
conceptions about the scope and method and material results of ex-
perimental psychology.
I. The chief gains that accrue from this paper are due to what may
naturally be called its epistemologicaP point of view. I do not alto-
gether like to put the matter thus, for I do not wish to lose light of
the positive psychology that it contains, or of its author's statement of
its ' main object.' And I also wish to do all I can to remove the
erroneous impression that, ' of course, philosophers never will make
any serious attempt to get really inside the psychological point of
view.' Mr. Titchener"s epistemological point of view is defined in
the first third of his paper in regard to the scope and the divisions of
psychological science, and in the second two-thirds in regard to what he
•Cf. the article by E. B. Titchener. Philosophical Jfeview, September,
1898, pp. 449-465.
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 Professor Titchener Informs us in a note, occupying the half of his first
page, that his article ' contains a part ' of hi6 ' reply' to a criticism (published
in this REVIEW, July, 1898) of his ' view of the psychological self,' made by me
at the 1897 meeting of the American Psychological Association. His article has
a value independently of that criticism of mine, and I shall not in the main
speak of it as a reply to my criticism. My criticism was not so much of his
' psychological self,' as such, as of the fact that he did not seem to me to allow,
in his treatment of the ' psychological self,' for some admissions that he made in
certain general portions of the book His present article opens up some impor-
tant epistemological considerations which at once generalize and dignify our
' discussion.' It is, at the present moment, idle to deplore or ignore methodo-
logical and plain statements regarding psychology and psychological facts-
There are not wanting signs, in a recent article (this REVIEW for November,
1898) by Professor Munsterberg, that he too has felt their necessity in dealing
•with some of his ' English' and ' foreign co-workers and critics. The ' discus-
sion,' too, of Professors Baldwin and Dewey in the November number of the
Philosophical Review certainly turns upon epistemological considerations re-
garding psychology-
s
 Professor Munsterberg uses this word, loc. cit.
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himself calls the nature and number of the structural elements of mind.
As an outcome of the first part we recognize how true were the words
of Mr. Stout, in his preface to his Analytic Psychology, about the com-
ing of the time when no one man would any more think of writing a
book upon psychology in general than he would think of writing a
book upon mathematics in general. (A) Mr. Titchener distinguishes
for us, with the help of biological considerations, ( i ) the psychology
of structure or structural psychology, (2) the psychology of function
or functional (descriptive) psychology, (3) ontogenetic psychology,
(4) taxonomic psychology, (5) social psychology, (6) phylogenetic
psychology. A ' very large portion of experimental psychology' is
really structural or morphological psychology; it is a ' vivisection
which shall yield structural, not functional results.' This is Mr.
Titchener's chosen domain—the discovery of "what is there [in
• mind'] and in what quantity, not what it is there for." His own Out-
line, he would have us infer, deals with the first of the six different
brands of psychology.
(B) ' ' There can be no doubt that much of the criticism passed upon
the new psychology depends upon the critic's failure to recognize its
morphological character." Surely, then, no one in the future will
criticise experimental psychology for not giving us what it does not
profess to give. Indeed, we shall not do so if the said experimental
psychology keep rigidly to its own point of view. (C) Mr. Titchener
again tells us that structural psychology has not yet come to an agree-
ment about more than the psychology of sensation and the constitu-
tion of the sensation element. He himself regards, as we know, the
affection process to be also an elemental process. A majority of psy-
chologists do this, he says, there being a minority who do not. " I t is
natural, in view of the intrinsic difficulty of the subject, that the psy-
chology of feeling should be in a less settled state than the psychology
of sensation." Going up higher, the ' anatomy of functional com-
plexes,' i. e , the structural study of the 'higher [mental] process,'
the ' perceptions and emotions and actions handed down in popular
and psychological tradition,' is as yet * * * a ' mere plan of arrange-
ment.' (D) As to the second way in which the epistemological point
of view is applied: " T h e elements of the experimentalists, as they
themselves have been the first to acknowledge, are artifacts, abstrac-
tions, usefully isolated for scientific ends, but not found in experience
save as connected with their like." This is emphatic enough. Let
us not any more go to experimentalists and say: ' Your sensations
and affections and volitions and emotions are very different things
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from what we actually experience, are just so many poor, thin, cari-
catures of the organic experiences we feel in daily life.' He can
reply to us that he is dealing with the structural phases of these pro-
cesses, and that for more than that we had better betake ourselves to
some of his colleagues. Now I think that I understand these four
points. Let me look at some of their consequences, for I must be
brief.
II. (1) As far as in him lies, should not a structural psychologist
observe that accuracy of confinement within his own proper sphere
that he request his critics to think about before attacking him? Mr.
Titchener says things about functional psychology that may be ques-
tioned, (a) " It cannot be said that this functional psychology, de-
spite what we may call its greater obviousness to investigation, has
been worked out with as much patient enthusiasm or with as much
scientific accuracy as has the psychology of mind structure." Far
be it from me to compare the zeal or the patience of a body of men
from the time of Aristotle to that of the English associationists with
that of the heroic pioneers and workers in the experimental psychology
of this century, but I shrug my shoulders and ask about the standard
of ' scientific accuracy' implied in the preceding and the following
sentence. "But it is also true that the methods of descriptive psy-
chology cannot, in the nature of the case, lead to results of scientific
finality." Finality on any one plane of investigation is a different
thing from finality along some other plane. Ai<potro S"uv Uavwz, el
xard TTJ-J inzuxec/j.(yrli' U?.TJV 5iaaa<frfizir^. Mr. Titchener's conception of
science in this article is, I think, to be inferred from his phrase about
the arrival of the ' t ime ' for ' the transformation [of psychology]
from philosophy to science.' He means experimental science, as that
is ordinarily understood, consequently he has no right to judge of
functional psychology merely from his standpoint. And if some of
his words in this article (to which I shall immediately refer) about
the last things of mind were true, some of his other four psycho-
logical disciplines would also be 'in the air,'—be absolutely unscientific.
(jS) Ought not a structural psychologist—and this point is even more
vital—to be able to adhere rigidly to his ' structural' point of view, at
least within the realm of his own observation and scientific disputa-
tion? I will adduce one or two reasons for saying that I do not find
Mr. Titchener to do this. ( / ) He uses the expressions ' elemental
processes' (457), and ' elements' (455,462), and ' last things of mind'
—I will not say interchangeably, but at least in a manner that makes
it difficult for the reader to keep the ' structural' view persistently in
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sight. I am only too painfully aware of the imperfections of lan-
guage to press this point, although I cannot overlook it nor fail to see
its influence in wrecking his own argument. I will, therefore, sup-
plement it by saying that perhaps he ought to be held responsible (/9)
only for the use of the two ' elements' called with admirable precision
the sensation-element and the affection-element. These two things
bear the weight of his whole article. He is endeavoring to set forth
the structural' elements' (450,453) in the elementary mental processes.
And his result is (462) : " The affection-element is constituted of
quality, intensity and duration; the sense-element (sensation or idea)
of quality, intensity, duration, clearness, and (in some cases) extent."
But quality, intensity, duration, etc., are not elements; they are
characteristics or categories [of sensation and affection]. That
is, despite his words constituted (and constituents (p. 450) ), he
does not analyze the sensation-element or the affection-element into
simpler elements. Nor are the sensation-element and the affection-
element themselves elements; they are processes or phases of pro-
cesses. (Mr. Titchener uses the word processes again and again on pp.
457-8-9, and he compares his elementary processes to other alleged
' processes,' such as will-processes, etc.) Now are processes, or
phases of processes, facts of structure or facts of sequence ? I think that
they are facts of sequence. Indeed, the very fact of process is not a fact
of ' structure,' but something more than this. In short, Mr. Titchener
does not succeed in maintaining the structural point of view through-
out the central sections of his article. (j~) Terminology and state-
ment apart, Mr. Titchener does not, in disputation, keep to his own
confession that the ' elements of the experimentalists are artifacts, ab-
stractions.' He uses them as if they were real things, and does bat-
tle with them against all other ' candidates' for ' elemental rank,' such
as alleged will-process. He uses them not merely ' for scientific ends'
but for dogmatic and ontological purposes. " What (459) is our jus-
tification for looking upon them [' these different processes,' preceding
sentence] as last things of mind ?" How, I ask, can an ' artifact' be
a. last thing of mind? A last thing of mind might, e. g., be the con-
nection which Mr. Titchener tells us always exists between these ele-
ments, but not the element as an ' artifact." '
11 purposely overlook Mr. Titchener's ' anatomical' reasons for regarding
sensation and affection as last things of mind. The ' irreducibility' test and the
physiology test yield different results to different psychologists, and would yield
different results to Mr. Titchener's six psychologists. Mr. Baldwin, e.g., rep-
resenting Mr. Titchener' & fifth kind of psychology, claims that the mind cannot
think of itself save as one term of a social relation. The inability of mind, if
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III. What I do find in Mr. Titchener's article is a double point of
view about structural psychology. (1) The conception of structural
psychology as denoting the accredited results of a certain point of
view regarding mental process or processes, to wit, the point of view
characterized by the categories of quality, intensity, quantity, duration,
etc. (2) The conception of structural psychology as depending upon
certain peculiarities in its object-matter, to wit, that its object-matter
is mental ' elements,' irreducibles of some kind or other. I think that
the first point of view is successfully set forth by Mr. Titchener as the
point of view adopted by experimental psychology, and, in general,
it is my opinion that experimental psychology should seek to differen-
tiate itself from the other five psychologies, not by its subject-matter
(for surely its hope is to treat all mental processes experimentally),
but by its point of view—its ' categories.' And I think that the sec-
ond point of view breaks down in Mr. Titchener's own hands. This
is enough for my purpose. Of course, I believe that it will break
down in anybody's hands.
W. CALDWELL.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD.1
These three articles of Mr. McDougall (read as papers before the
Aristotelian Society, London) seem to have an undoubted relevancy
and utility at the present time, when the subject of psychological
method is for various reasons being actively discussed. They accom-
plish their purpose, if by method we mean (with Mr. McDougall)
not so much ways and means of going to work in psychology, but the
method of conceiving the scope of psychology and of psychological
processes. By their contention that there can be ' no complete science
of conscious processes' as such, they will be welcome to the experi-
mentalists ; while, by their view of the dynamic function of conscious-
ness and of the efficient or active relation sustained by ' conscious' to
' neural' process, they will gratify the opponents of what, in the re-
real, is a last tiling about the mind, just as much as the perception of color. In
one regard it is a ' complex' fact; in another it is a simple and irreducible fact.
The physiology test, again, yields the fact of function as a last thing about
mind. A physiological expert, e. g., Mr. J. S. Haldane, insists {Nin. Cent,
Sept., '98) on the difference between physiological and mechanical process, by
holding that physiology studies vital functions. All this shows that DO one
kind of psychology is entitled to talk about the last things of mind.
1
 A Contribution towards an Improvement in Psychological Method. W-
McDougall. Mind, New Series, Nos. 25, 26, 27, January, April, July, 1898.
